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ABSTRACT 
As the Army continues its transformation into a more lethal and responsive 
force, in the midst of the War on Terror, it becomes increasingly important to 
make qualitative and critical assessments of our progress.  One of the most 
important aspects of that transformation is how we educate the leaders of 
tomorrow.  Are we providing the quality institutional education that will allow 
these new officers to meet the challenges of modern warfighting in the 
contemporary operating environment?   
The developmental education systems of the United States Military 
Academy and the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps are designed to provide the 
foundational knowledge, skills and attributes to ensure success in combat and 
continued, lifelong learning.  In this regard, both systems are marked with much 
improvement over the past several years.  In fact, today’s graduates are more 
capable and informed than any of their predecessors. Despite the improvements, 
daunting challenges remain for both systems, though they differ in nature and 
solution.  The physical transformation of our Army is continuous and so too must 
be the mental transformation.  Without improved focus on leadership, adaptability 
and the skills of the Pentathlete leader, our young officers face the prospect of 
fighting wars for which they are physically, but not yet mentally, prepared.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
American military education has at its heart two crucial processes—
the making of lieutenants and the making of colonels.  How we 
prepare young men to lead others into battle, and how we ensure 
that those who assume the highest levels of commands are well-
qualified, are issues that must be addressed with the utmost 
seriousness, because failure here can have the gravest of 
consequences.1 
As the quote above indicates, leader development is particularly important 
in the creation of our junior leaders.  Their ability to master the skills, develop the 
attributes and gain the knowledge required of leaders on tomorrow’s battlefield 
will determine the outcome of war’s fought in a new operating environment.  
Gone are the days when successful performance of a few mission essential 
tasks translated to battlefield successes.   Not only have the number of tasks to 
be performed increased exponentially, but so has their complexity.  The strategic 
environment in which today’s Army finds itself has changed so dramatically since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, that, to remain relevant, every aspect of the 
Army must make commensurate changes.  While most are familiar with the 
technological and structural transformations that the Army has undertaken, there 
is little known about the efforts to educate leaders in a transformative way.  The 
lack of understanding is in part because very little has been done in the way of 
changing education, when compared to the physical transformations.  Our 
response to the new era of warfighting has been to update our equipment, invest 
in new-technology and re-structure our forces with the goal of creating a relevant 
land force capable of fighting and winning in any environment.  The ever-
changing, asymmetric, often ambiguous strategic environment, as well as our 
predominantly physical response to it, have placed increasing challenges on 
leaders at all echelons of command.   
                                            
1 Theodore J. Crackel, “On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels,” The Public Interest 76 
(Summer 1984): 18. 
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Training will not suffice.  There are simply too many tasks on which to train 
in order to gain any semblance of mastery.  For that matter, task mastery, if 
possible, would not secure victory.  Victory rests and will continue to rest in the 
mind of young leaders; those making the decisions in the gray area between 
peace and war.  How they act should not be driven by rote memorization or the 
lock-step following and issuance of orders, but by their intuition, assessment of 
the situation, critical analysis of the problem and ability to put the situation in the 
context of the bigger picture.  Above all, it comes down to decisive leadership at 
the critical moment; adaptive when the situation changes and anticipatory of the 
consequences.  As the most dynamic component of combat power, leadership 
has won the day in countless battles and will continue to do so as long as our 
military remains in existence.2  The physical tools have been provided, but are 
the mental attributes necessary in deciding when, how and if to use them being 
developed adequately?  It is within this human dimension of combat that lay the 
keys to success.  Strengthening this dimension will require the greatest 
investment of time and resources. 
This will require a cultural shift, from measuring success by the killing of 
the enemy and capturing of his equipment, to the realization that this is only a 
small component of success.  Victory lies in the populations we are charged with 
protecting.  When, regardless of what the enemy does, the populations, their 
minds and collective actions side with us, we will win.  This cultural shift is best 
attained in those who’ve experienced no other Army culture to which they can 
default; our newest and future leaders. 
While field and flag grade officers must make sweeping changes to amend 
our approach to fighting a modern war, nowhere in our Army is the effect of the 
global landscape more profound than it is on junior officers and leaders.  For that 
reason, this paper focuses not on the continued or advanced education of mid-
grade and senior officers, but on the foundational development of our junior 
                                            
2 Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army (Washington, 2001), 
4-7. 
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leaders.  It is among this group that we find the least experience, least expertise 
and highest likelihood for error.  Because they are on the forefront of a war of 
and for minds, visible to the world, their errors will have the gravest impact on the 
outcome.  Conversely, however, in this group of young and future leaders, we 
find the most malleable raw material from which to begin a transformation in 
thinking and learning.  This group possesses the most transformation-ready 
minds in the force, unfettered by organizational learning and biases, with no 
memory of the ideology that brought victory in the past.  This study seeks to 
analyze the strategic, operational and tactical environment in which young 
leaders of our Army currently find themselves; and will continue to find 
themselves in the foreseeable future.  In doing so, we can answer some of the 
more challenging and debated questions of officer education: 1) What are the 
educational requirements for young officers in the current and future operating 
environment?  2) Does the current system provide the breadth and depth of 
learning required of that environment?  3) If not, what changes are needed to 
create a program of developmental learning that will create the “Pentathlete” 
Leader we so desperately need to wage tomorrow’s wars?3 
Chapter II analyzes the environment in which leaders find themselves.  It 
looks at not only the tactical situations, but the strategic implications that those 
situations may generate.  The environmental analysis will necessarily focus on 
some of the more important changes since the end of the Cold War: the global 
landscape, the nature of our conflict, the effect of technology and information on 
the battlefield, and the physical environment; urban and populated.  In analyzing 
this new environment, it becomes clear that young officers must not only learn 
new and more complex tasks, but understand their environment from a more 
strategic standpoint.  Contextual knowledge of the nation, region and its people 
become more important.  Cognitive skills, knowing “how to think” as opposed to  
                                            
3 “Pentathlete” is a term used by Secretary of the Army Harvey and Army Chief of Staff, GEN 
Schoomaker, in the 2007 Army Posture Statement, to describe a leader who is agile and 
adaptive, able to learn and adapt to new situations in a constantly changing environment. 
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what to think must be developed and nurtured.  The environment will also show 
that leaders must become more self-aware, adaptive, emotionally intelligent and 
critically-thinking.4 
Chapter III describes the current junior officer education system in the 
construct of the Army’s three “domains” of learning: the institutional, the 
operational and the self-development.  The chapter will describe the reasons for 
and summary of the changes that have occurred in the last decade, and the 
resultant system.  As this thesis pertains to junior officers, this chapter will focus 
on the two primary pre-commissioning education systems, the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (ROTC) and the United States Military Academy (USMA), as well 
as the immediate post-commissioning schools.  Of the three “domains” of 
learning this paper will address the institutional, as it provides the foundation for 
development in the other two.   
Chapter IV will analyze the current system and make assessments as to 
whether or not the current junior officer education systems are meeting the 
challenges that arise in the contemporary operating environment.  The basis of 
analysis is how effectively those systems develop the characteristics of a 
“Pentathlete” warrior, as defined by the Army Chief of Staff and Army Secretary.5  
Finally, the chapter will include a recommendation for changes in our officer 
education system to maximize development of the knowledge, attributes and 
skills required of young leaders in the future operating environment.   The costs 
and risks of the recommended changes are subjects that require further and 
separate study.  While not addressed in this thesis, they will principally involve 
increased time and money spent on pre-commissioning education and the 
education of qualified and competent instructors. 
                                            
4 Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the 
Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center For Defense Information, 2006), 42-46. 
5 In 2005, the Army senior leadership described the leader of the future Army as a 
“Pentathlete;” multi-skilled across the full-spectrum, adaptive, agile, innovative, skilled in 
governorship, statesmanship and diplomacy and culturally astute, to name a few of the qualities. 
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II. NEW ENVIRONMENT, NEW REQUIREMENTS  
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.  
The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the 
occasion.  As our case is new, so must we think anew and act 
anew.6 
     -President Abraham Lincoln 
A. THE GLOBAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE 
The last 15 years are marked with some of the most sweeping social, 
political and economic upheavals in recent history.  Amidst the changes, our 
concept of what constitutes a security threat and the corresponding Cold War 
assumptions must be radically reexamined.7  While some threats from the Cold 
War era remain, they are joined by an increasingly complex array of global 
issues that pose credible and growing threats to our security.   
The Soviet collapse brought a premature sigh of relief for many security 
practitioners, based partially in the belief that the world was now a safer place.  
Fast forward to the new millennium and we can see that security remains 
somewhat distant, still beyond our grasp.  While the threat of Armageddon has 
subsided with the collapse of our most feared enemy, the threat of violence has 
only increased, though in new forms.  In 2002, there were 175 small-scale 




                                            
6 Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress, 1 December 1862; available from 
http://home.att.net/~howingtons/abe.html, accessed 11 October 2007. 
7 Graham H. Turbiville, “Preface: Future Trends in Low Intensity Conflict,” in Networks, 
Terrorism and Global Insurgency. Robert J. Bunker, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006), xi. 
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genocidal ethnic wars occurring simultaneously throughout the globe.8 Since the 
end of the Persian Gulf War, some 80-120 million people have lost their lives, 
most to violence.9 
Of the 192 member nations in the United Nations, a growing number are 
considered to be failed or failing states.  These nations, unable or unwilling to 
provide for their people, are at the heart of the violence.  Failing governments are 
being subjected to challenges to their sovereignty by both internal and external 
competitors and the resultant violence and depravity have caused an upward 
spiral of UN and other international peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
strategies; in which the U.S. Army plays an important role.  These conflicts give 
rise to new, non-traditional actors in an increasingly violent world.  Gone are wars 
fought for expansion and imperialism.  The new wars are fought for autonomy, 
scarce resources, ideology, ethnicity, culture and survival.  Far from peaceful 
settlement, “these wars beget more violence, more despair and a resort to more 
asymmetric tactics as increasingly incompetent, corrupt and intolerant quasi-
governments come to power.”10 
In a new chaotic world order, national security takes a tangential departure 
from deterring a near-peer competitor to nation-building, enforcement of civil 
rights and human liberties and policing.  While other instruments of statecraft are 
sure to be used to stem the violence, the interjection of the Army is almost 
assured.  America’s Army will increasingly find itself not waging war against a 
singular enemy, but quelling one between multiple factions.  In doing so, we will 
find ourselves in the midst of what Lind, Wilson, Sutten and Schmidt define as 
4th Generation Warfare, or 4GW.11  4th Generation warfare is “undefined, 
nonlinear, with no definable fronts and where the distinction between war and 
                                            
8 Max G. Manwaring, “The New Global Security Landscape: The Road Ahead,” in Networks, 
Terrorism and Global Insurgency. Robert J. Bunker, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21. 
9 Ibid., 21. 
10 Ibid., 22. 
11 William S. Lind et al. “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine 
Corps Gazette, October 1989, 22-26. 
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peace is blurred.” We will find ourselves protecting the legitimacy and 
sovereignty of friendly governments, preventing state failure; and assisting in the 
toppling of hostile governments.  At stake is regional and global stability that will 
affect the business, economic and security aspects of American life.  It is in this 
world that the future leaders of the Army will find themselves, and for it, they 
must be prepared.  Here, mastery of military tactics and doctrine, and 
technological wizardry will be of lesser value than a thorough understanding of 
the politico-military situation in which we find ourselves.  4GW dictates that 
officers will be exposed to more complex and ambiguous problems earlier in their 
career.  As the glide-path for learning becomes steeper, our youngest warrior-
leaders will be statesman, ambassadors and police.  Our professional military 
education system must be up to the task of preparation. 
B. THE NATURE OF WAR, THE ENEMY AND THE PHYSICAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
In FM 1, the Army categorically defines the future enemy challenges as: 
traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic.12  The traditional enemy threat 
is that from a conventional army, with recognizable military capabilities and 
fighting in well-understood manner, adhering to the general laws of war.  Iran, 
North Korea and China are the most recognized possessors of this type of threat, 
though not exclusively.  Irregular threats are those that aspire to use 
unconventional means to bypass the traditional force advantages of their 
opponent.13  They seek to mitigate their adversary’s military power by forcing a 
conflict on their terms, terms that necessarily limit the applicability of that power.  
Catastrophic threats are those that arise from the proliferation and acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  The 2004 National Military Strategy  
 
 
                                            
12 FM 1, The Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army (Washington, DC: 2005), 4-1. 
13 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (Hartford, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 214. 
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defines disruptive threats as “challenges that may come from adversaries who 
develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in 
key operational domains.”14 
Clearly, the traditional threat is that for which we are most prepared.  The 
Persian Gulf War and the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom are illustrative 
of our prowess in countering the nature of this threat.  It is the other three that 
represent the greatest departure from the status quo.  Catastrophic and 
disruptive threats will certainly require military action, but the nature of these 
threats are such that they are not likely to be performed by the Army at large, but 
by Special Operations Forces and other government agencies.  The threat most 
likely to be faced by the vast number of junior officers is that posed by 
adversaries employing irregular means. 
As the environmental synopsis above alludes, this threat is growing and is 
perpetrated by an ever-widening range of adversaries.  Not only is the enemy a 
state or state-like group, but growing numbers of non-state and sub-state 
organizations are challenging local, regional and international security, facilitated 
by the collapsing legitimacy of states.  Some, like Al Qaeda, are direct 
antagonists to the U.S., while others are not; though their actions are detrimental 
to the security of our allies.  Added to the fray are organized criminal enterprises 
and other illegal armed groups.15 
From the perspective of the junior officer, the method by which the enemy 
operates is as important as who constitutes the threat.  As insurgents and violent 
sectarian groups in Iraq suggest, the enemy is operating within the grey area 
between peace and war.  He is well armed, un-uniformed and displays utter 
contempt for the civilians by whom he is surrounded and has no concern for the 
law of war or human rights.  The most dangerous enemy fights not in formations, 
armed with tanks and artillery, but in small, networked cells, interconnected and 
                                            
14 “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” Office of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, 2004), 4. 
15 “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” Office of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, 2004), 5. 
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autonomous.  The enemy in Iraq, our most relevant example, hides among the 
civilian populace and from them garners support, protection and information.  He 
is unrecognizable until he attacks and when he does, it is at the time and place of 
his choosing.  This irregular approach has served him well in mitigating our force 
advantage and rendering technology ineffectual.16 
If the struggle in Iraq is indeed an introduction to the way in which future 
wars will be fought, we must pay strict attention to the effect that civilian 
populations have on our ability to wage war effectively.  Iraqi insurgents have 
learned, with our enemies watching, that the persistent presence of large civilian 
populations is an effective way to hold in check the power of our weapons and 
the effectiveness of our technology.  For this reason, insurgents and terrorists 
choose not to fight in open deserts, but in heavily populated urban centers.  
There, the presence of non-combatants and media coverage assures that heavy-
handed actions, possibly by a highly trained but improperly educated young 
leader, produce a strategic victory.  The nature of today’s enemy places our 
smallest elements, led by our most junior leaders in near-constant contact with 
civilians across the battlespace.  While killing or capturing insurgents are one of 
many tasks to be executed by young leaders and their units, the people by whom 
they are surrounded everyday are their mission.  The operating environment is 
one in which we are to secure populations, maintain order, provide civic action, 
appease grievances, promote goodwill and instill good governance.  The young 
leaders in Iraq, or any number of failing or failed states in the future, are finding 
their roles to be ever more complex. As Iraqis increasingly adopt sectarian 
identities, it becomes more apparent that this is a war for the minds and wills of 
people.17  It is in this operating environment and for this mission that we must 
educate leaders.   
                                            
16 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: 
Zenith Press, 2006), 190-202. 
17 James A. Baker III et al, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute for Peace, 6 December 2006), 8. 
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But not all of the challenges are brought on by the irregular nature of the 
enemy.  Technologic improvements have led to an increasingly sparse and 
diffuse battlefield.  Forces are no longer massed in large formations attacking the 
enemy on along a known front.  Today’s Army fights in a dispersed, 
discontinuous battlefield, with smaller units responsible for ever growing areas of 
terrain and corresponding populations.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting is 
typically done at the platoon level, with enemy engagements rarely involving 
larger U.S. formations.  Radio, satellite and internet connectivity has replaced 
face-to-face interaction between leaders and subordinates.  In this situation, 
junior leaders are more likely to find themselves in operational environments very 
different from that of their adjacent units and that of their commanders.  The lack 
of direct oversight can drive decision making to lower echelons, forcing young 
leaders to act of their own accord. Decentralization, however, does not mean 
isolation.  Through modern intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
systems, commanders are able to “see” the battlefield in which young leaders are 
fighting.  But sight does not equate to understanding.  Although commanders 
may be connected electronically to their young leaders, the very fact that they are 
often not co-located limits the relevance of their guidance and rapid changes in 
the situation can make it quickly obsolete.  More and more, decisions of our 
youngest leaders are becoming theirs and theirs alone.  With near real-time 
media coverage and ever-present civilian populations, those decisions no longer 
rest solely in the tactical domain.  The 2004 shift of Ar Rutbah, Iraq from a 
tranquil area to a hub of violence is demonstrative of how tactical and ethical 
missteps at the lowest levels can move an entire town into the “loss column.”18 
C. NEW REQUIREMENTS 
Professional Military Education (PME) has been the subject of much 
debate since the end of the Cold War.  The essence of this debate is rightfully 
                                            
18 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2007), 276. 
 11
centered on the changing global security environment addressed earlier.  With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faces a far more dynamic, 
and in many ways, more challenging world arena in which our military forces 
must perform the vital mission of protecting and advancing our national interests 
and those of our allies.  Indeed, the operating environment in which company 
grade officers find themselves is unrecognizable to those trained for the Cold 
War; large-scale, direct military action against a near-peer.  In the face of new, 
ambiguous and emerging crises, the task of educating officers in the Army faces 
the challenge of remaining relevant and appropriate in the ever-changing global 
landscape.19  “The transformation of the Army demands a change in our 
educational approach and philosophy. The first element of this may be for the 
Army to recognize that conflicts such as Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti are 
not unique, but rather are the types of conflicts that we will be engaging in for a 
significant period of time.”20 
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) continues to prove that the enemy has 
changed, the method of employing our troops has changed, the terrain has 
changed and, therefore, what we require of our young leaders has also changed.  
Success in the current and future operating environment is less about killing 
adversaries and more about protecting populations and infrastructure, 
maintaining freedoms and furthering democracy. 
To that end, a strictly tactical education, with a focus on task mastery, may 
prove to be inadequate.  The training that has proved successful in high-intensity 
ground combat (major combat operations) may not translate well to the future 
operating environment, against an irregular foe.  Young leaders must possess 
cognitive skills that will inform them how to think in a maneuver/counter-
maneuver (strategic) mindset that creates tactical mismatches.  They must 
possess the brainpower to fight a war of and for minds, when his weapons are 
                                            
19 Cynthia A. Watson, Military Education, A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2007), xi. 
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not sufficient, in and of themselves, to secure victory.  Without a properly 
educated, and to a degree, strategically minded company grade leader, 
transformation of our military in terms of structure and equipment is merely 
cosmetic.  For that reason, education should be the foundation of any 
transformative efforts. 
Undoubtedly, in-depth training in individual skills and small unit drill are 
mandatory and indispensable on the battlefield.  Young leaders possessing these 
skills will save soldiers lives and defeat the enemy.  Regrettably, they cannot 
defeat the armed enemy they cannot find, and killing him will not win the war.  A 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, for example, is not simply a lesser included 
form of major combat operations (MCO).  Instead, it is a completely different kind 
of war, one that requires a completely different application and type of force in 
size, structure and competencies.  A transformation is currently underway, but its 
discussions and applications tend to be limited to equipment and structure, with 
recent and tentative steps aimed at education.  Advanced equipment and new 
structures will only be effective if we first educate our most junior leadership 
differently; transformation must first take hold in the mind of the leader before it 
can take hold in the organization.   
With the arrival of the information age, an age in which the “narrative” 
(message, perception) of a ground operation has far greater effect than the 
action itself, the requirement for strategic thinking has moved and continues to 
move to lower echelons of command, throughout the force.21  Every tactical 
action now possesses a strategic or political consequence.  A tactical success 
can easily create a strategic failure and realizing this, the young leader must not 
only be a tactician, but have the wherewithal to understand the strategic 
implications of his actions, in a broader sense, on the campaign and policy.  As 
Cebrowski succinctly notes, “warfare is bigger than combat and combat is bigger 
                                            
20 Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, “Transforming Strategic Leader Education for 
the 21st Century,” Parameters (Autumn 2001): 17-33. 
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than shooting.”22 To facilitate this thinking, young officers must understand the 
cultural context in which wars of our generation will be fought.  Critical to this 
understanding is knowledge in areas of diplomacy, building consensus, conflict 
resolution, negotiation, mediation / arbitration, interagency familiarization, 
intelligence collection, basic civic action and coordination; all skills they are 
required to develop through operational experience on a daily basis in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan as they are not addressed adequately in institutional learning 
environments.  Those skills, once the domain of Army senior leaders is now the 
province of the lieutenant.  If we hope to master the military art in such a complex 
operating environment, it will require leaders who are adaptive, able to think 
critically, intuitive, developed emotionally, culturally astute and self-aware.23   
The net effect is that today’s young officers enter a world that is infinitely 
more dangerous and hostile.  The insurgency in Iraq is demonstrative of 4GW in 
that there exists no clearly defined battlefield and transition from peaceful civic 
action to close combat and vice versa can occur in a matter of minutes.  Adapting 
to this environment is not a matter of materiel and technology, but one of 
education and understanding.  The leaders on the battlefield must come to learn 
that their actions and reactions may have much to do with whether or not that 
shift occurs and how often it does.     
Despite the lacking eminent danger of a strategic military competitor, a 
nation with the capability and will to confront the United States militarily, the 
national security of the United States may be as precarious as ever.  The 
collapse of the Soviet Union has served to end the era of a polarized globe, 
replacing it with a fragmented international society of conflicting ideologies, 
beliefs and goals.  Conflict is on the rise and although smaller in nature, it 
                                            
21 John Arquilla, “Warfare in the Information Age,” (Class lecture), Naval Postgraduate 
School (Monterey, CA: Fall 2006). 
22 John T. Bennett, “Cebrowski Calls For New Training Methods For Combat, Postwar Ops,” 
Inside the Pentagon, September 11, 2003, 3. 
23 Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with 
the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center For Defense Information, 2006), 42-46. 
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continues to pose credible and growing threats to our security and that of our 
allies.  The U.S. faces military challenges in major regional conflicts, dealing with 
internal threats to friendly regimes, addressing a host of transnational dangers, 
supporting large-scale disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations and 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.24   “These threats 
blur the traditional distinctions among military, law enforcement and other roles 
and missions and have strong interagency and international dimensions in an 
environment characterized by change, uncertainty and surprise.”25 Furthermore, 
“how we perceive these threats will be a strong determinant of the types of forces 
we try to acquire, the doctrine we develop and the training we follow for use of 
those forces in combat.”26   
In Iraq, our perception was not very different from that of 1990-1991, 
when, through conventional means, we ousted Saddam and his Army from 
Kuwait with relative ease.  Four years later, the perceptual error has become 
painfully obvious, and while our perception has indeed shifted, we have been 
slow, as an Army, to adapt strategy in both education and application of force to 
match the modified perception.  Our ability, as an organization, to adapt to the 
change is an important component of our ability to guarantee our own security.27  
The ambiguity of an environment that is rife with constant and unpredictable 
change will necessitate that the Army become what Nagl calls a learning 
organization.28  Critical to learning is the inculcation of a culture that rewards 
creativity and adaptability.  The new culture is not an abandonment of what we 
know, but an acceptance of the changing world. The threat of major combat 
                                            
24 Graham H. Tuberville et al, “The Changing Security Environment,” Military Review, June-
July 1997 [journal online]; available from http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/1stmr.htm; 
Internet; accessed 11 October 2007. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 128. 
27 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (Hartford, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 214. 
28 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (Hartford, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 6. 
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operations against a conventionally armed military force still exists, and for it we 
must also be prepared.  The cultural change, grounded in education, is the 
broadening of our force into a truly full-spectrum capability, focusing on the 
development of knowledge, skills and attributes that are applicable in any 
environment.  Education that will produce cognitively developed, critically 
thinking, emotionally intelligent young strategists will be the cornerstone of 
change and will extend our competence well beyond the high-end of the conflict 
spectrum and into the environment that exists when the tanks and artillery are 
silent.  It is here that the gap in education, and by extension, the gap in 
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III. THE CURRENT PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM  
The focus of leader development is on the future to prepare 
Soldiers and civilians for increasing levels of responsibility.  Leader 
development is accomplished through a lifelong learning process 
that takes place through operational experience, in Army schools 
and training centers, and self-development.29 
A. BABY STEPS IN A NEW DIRECTION 
In October of 1999, the Army leadership released The Army Vision, in 
which is explained how the Army will meet the security requirements of the nation 
in the 21st century.  The Army Vision laid the foundations for the Army’s 
continuing transformation into what is known as the Objective Force; “a force that 
is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of 
conflict.”30   
Subsequently, in 2001, the Army published FM 1, the Army, and FM 3-0, 
Operations, which explained the “role and contributions of the Army at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and as a member of joint, 
interagency and multinational teams.”  The documents provide the context for a 
complete understanding of Army Transformation and the Objective Force—how 
The Army operates as the land component of America’s joint war-fighting 
team.”31  The Army Vision, FM 1 The Army (2001) and FM 3-0 Operations 
(2001), prescribe seven characteristics that will guide the transformation to the 
Objective Force: responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and 
sustainable.  
                                            
29 “2007 Army Modernization Plan, Annex C: Training and Leader Development.” 
Washington DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, 2007; available at 
http://www.army.mil/institution/leaders/modplan/2007/high-
res/Army%20Mod%20Plan%202007.pdf; retrieved 6 July 2007. 
30 “The Objective Force White Paper.” Office of the Chief of Staff, Army (Washington: 2001). 
31 Ibid. 
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In 2001, the achievement of these characteristics was largely based in the 
development and fielding of new equipment to enable a strategic response to 
crises anywhere in the spectrum of conflict.  However, two of the characteristics, 
agility and versatility, will be founded not on technology, but in the human 
dimension; the development of leaders and soldiers capable of innovation and 
creativity.  Recognizing the importance of soldiers and leaders as a foundation of 
change, the Objective Force White Paper states that professional education must 
develop more knowledgeable and competent commanders and junior leaders.  
Creating the objective force warrior in 2001, however, was based in technology.  
Web-based command and control systems and distributive learning techniques 
are prescribed to reduce decision time and provide information dominance in any 
environment.  Collaborative planning and rapid dissemination of orders would 
maximize time to prepare for and synchronize operations at the tactical level.  
New technology would enable the leader to “see” the battlefield with unparalleled 
fidelity and understanding, at the lowest levels possible.  Our reliance on new 
technologies, equipment and methods served the Army well in the routing of the 
Taliban in 2001-2002 and the destruction of the Iraqi regime in the Spring of 
2003.  A technical and structural focus in transformation has indeed served to 
increase lethality, deployability, versatility, sustainability, agility, responsiveness 
and survivability.  Since then, however, technology and equipment have proven 
themselves an incomplete prescription for fighting in ambiguous environments 
against a dedicated enemy intent on attacking our weaknesses, asymmetrically.  
In fact, one could make the argument that an over-reliance on technology is one 
of our weaknesses, easily defeated by simple, low-technology tactics, techniques 
and procedures (TTP’s). 
Technology, structure and equipment, for all their virtues, cannot provide 
the contextual understanding of the conflict in which young leaders will 
undoubtedly find themselves.  Nor can technology make the decision for the 
leader.  A valuable lesson learned from our current struggles in Afghanistan and 
Iraq is the primacy of the human dimension.  More than technology or weapons, 
 19
a well-educated leader, who can critically analyze the situation, make timely 
decisions in the face of ambiguity and fully understand the consequences, will be 
critical for success.   
With transformation in terms of organization, doctrine and materiel moving 
swiftly, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) turned to leaders, and in June of 
2000 chartered the Army Training and Leader Development Panels (ATLDP) to 
make an assessment of current education systems for non-commissioned 
officers, civilians, warrant officers and commissioned officers, and provide 
recommendations for change in order to develop leaders more capable of 
functioning in the operating environment in the first part of the new century.  The 
panel released four reports, of which, the Phase III report assessed and made 
recommendations for change to the officer education system.  The panel 
compiled data from surveys and interviews with over 10,000 officers of all grades 
to produce the report.  In plain terms, the officers in the field summarized their 
concerns in several aspects of professional service to include education, culture, 
training and quality of life.  With respect to education, junior officers indicated that 
their military service was not meeting their expectations.  Specifically, they felt 
that they were not receiving adequate leader development experiences, lack of 
trust was causing pervasive micromanagement, personnel management priorities 
in terms of operational assignments were at the expense of developmental 
experiences and the Officer Education System (OES) was not providing them 
with the skills needed for success in full spectrum operations.32  The officer 
development weaknesses are apparent to junior officers in both operational 
experience and institutional learning.  The Army’s “up-or-out” promotion system 
creates a development problem by requiring all officers of a particular field to 
hold the same types of jobs before being eligible for promotion.33  DA Pam 600-
                                            
32 “The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army,” 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, May 2001; available from 
http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf; retrieved 30 March 2007. 
33 Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with 
the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center For Defense Information, 2006), 67. 
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3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, is the 
governing document that requires officers to meet these career “gates” prior to 
being considered for promotion. To meet this requirement, the personnel 
management system is designed to give everyone the same opportunity at 
specific jobs, significantly reducing the length of time that a young officer spends 
doing any one job.  The second order effect is a lack of trust by commanders 
based on junior officer’s limited experience, leading to micromanagement.  The 
second weakness lies in the level of preparedness that young officers feel after 
completing the required institutional courses.  While being told of their need to be 
effective in the full spectrum of conflict, education, both pre- and post-
commissioning, focuses disproportionately on major combat operations (MCO).  
The panel submitted eighty-nine recommendations at the conclusion of their 
study, the most significant of which were the recommended changes in the 
officer education system.  “The Panel’s work provides compelling evidence that a 
main effort in Army transformation should be to link training and leader 
development to prepare Army leaders for full-spectrum operations.”34 
Because the ATLDP report was published prior to 9/11, the Director of the 
Army Staff, in a follow-up initiative, under authority from the CSA and Secretary 
of the Army created the Review of Education, Training and Assignments for 
Leaders (RETAL) task force on 6 July 2005 to examine the policies governing 
education, training and assignments for officers, non-commissioned officers, 
warrant officers and civilians.  The study also served to validate the pre-9/11 
ATLDP recommendations.  The task force conducted their study from October 
2005 through June 2006 and released a final report of recommendations, along 
with the Army Pentathlete Leader model.  The RETAL task force 
recommendations included expanding competency to full spectrum, including 
non-kinetic expertise, broadening the full spectrum culture and addressing gaps 
in mental agility, cultural awareness, governance, enterprise management and 
                                            
34 “The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army,” 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, May 2001; available from 
http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf; retrieved 30 March 2007. 
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strategic leadership.35  The RETAL recommendations, in conjunction with the 
validated recommendations of the ATLDP were released in October 2006 in a 
new document, Army Leaders for the 21st Century (AL21) Implementation 
Guidance; an integrated plan to improve the leader development process.36  In 
short, the Army has begun to realize the strain that the current operating 
environment places on young leaders who are ill-prepared for full spectrum 
conflict resulting from antiquated education system steeped in conventional 
thought and based primarily on repetitive task training.  The 2007 Army Posture 
Statement summarizes the AL 21 report in stating that  
we recognize that intellectual change precedes physical change. 
For this reason, we are developing qualities in our leaders, our 
people, our forces – and the institutions which generate and sustain 
them – that will enable them to operate effectively amidst 
uncertainty and unpredictability. We describe the leaders we are 
creating as “pentathletes,” whose versatility and agility– qualities 
that reflect the essence of our Army – will enable them to learn and 
to adapt to new situations in a constantly evolving environment. To 
ensure that our Soldiers are well led, we are now actively 
implementing the findings of a comprehensive review focused on 
how we train, educate, assign, and develop our officers, 
noncommissioned officers, and civilian leaders.37 
 Identifying the problem, however, is the easy part.  Developing the 
strategy to create the Pentathlete leader is harder.  Still more difficult is 
implementing that strategy.  The current strategy to create the Pentathlete leader 
centers on the Army school system, on-the-job training (operational 
development) and self-development.  While there are strengths in the Army’s 
implementation plan, it lacks development of pre-commissioning education 
systems and focuses too heavily on the Major (O4) and above ranks, when 
character and mental attributes have already been defined by the organization, 
                                            
35 “Army Leaders for the 21st Century, Final Report.” Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Army. November 2006; available at 
http://cpol.army.mil/library/train/docs/AL21-Final.pdf, retrieved on 2 April 2007. 
36 “Army Posture Statement.” Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, Army. 2007. 
37 “2007 Army Posture Statement,” Executive Office of the Headquarters Strategy Group, 14 
February 2007; available from http:\\www.army.mil\aps\07; retrieved 20 March 2007. 
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making change more difficult.38  The Army junior officer education system is, for 
many leaders, a training system, not an education system.  Junior and future 
officers learn critical skills through repetition and memorization.  Central to the 
problem in creating adaptive, Pentathlete leaders is the lack of emphasis on the 
institutional learning domain, specifically, pre-commissioning. The cognitive and 
emotional development, self awareness and intuition required of an adaptive and 
agile leader take years to develop, much longer than can be accomplished in any 
post-commissioning, short duration course.  Without a firm ground in institutional 
development, achieving success in the operational or self-learning domains will 
be hampered.  A leaders’ ability to learn in these domains is dependent on their 
earlier development of the skills critical to adaptability and agility.   
B. DOMAINS OF LEARNING 
The Army Leader Development program revolves around three “domains” 
of learning.  These domains are intended to interact and provide the types of 
feedback and assessments necessary to create the type of leader required for 
the current and future operational environments.  The endstate is readiness for 
warfighting, in any environment.  Each of the domains is designed to include 
measurable actions that must occur to successfully develop Army leaders, of all 
ranks.39 
The institutional domain is the first learning domain that future officers 
enter.  It includes the civilian and military education schools and Joint service 
schools.40  The focus of this domain is on education, or “how to.”  It is intended to 
provide the young officer or future officer with the tools required to successfully 
and effectively continue learning in the operational domain.  Without a solid 
                                            
38 Vandergriff, 24. 
39 “2007 Army Posture Statement,” Executive Office of the Headquarters Strategy Group, 
Department of the Army (Washington, 14 February 2007), 37; available from 
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bedrock of institutional learning, development in the operational domain will be 
hampered by an inability to recognize the lessons to be learned or 
misinterpretation of feedback.  The ROTC and West Point curricula are examples 
of learning in the institutional domain, as are follow on Basic Officer Leadership 
Courses.  Regardless of the forum, the institutional domain is responsible for 
teaching leaders Army doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP’s).  
For junior officers, the Officer Education System (OES) is comprised of a three 
part series of instruction called the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC). 
BOLC I, II and III comprise the Initial Military Training (IMT) of OES.  BOLC I is 
the officers pre-commissioning training, conducted through either ROTC or the 
United States Military Academy. BOLC II is the first training that officers attend 
after commissioning and is intended to enhance confidence and mastery of tasks 
associated with inculcating a “warrior ethos.”  BOLC III is branch specific 
technical training required of officers in their specialty branch, i.e. infantry, armor, 
quartermaster.41  Completion of all three is required before an officer enters the 
force. 
The second domain is the operational.  This domain includes all the 
actions and learning experiences that are generated while serving in the 
warfighting force.  The operational domain is the learning environment in which 
young officers find themselves when they reach their first few assignments.  At 
their units, officers participate in day-to-day operations and sustainment, training 
individual and collective skills necessary for mission accomplishment, training 
rotations at Combat Training Centers (CTC’s), field exercises and combat 
deployments.  The primary source of feedback includes evaluation, counseling 
and mentorship from commanders, peers and subordinates.  This feedback is 
intended to provide a young officer with assessment of his performance, 
identification of skills, knowledge and attributes necessary for success, and areas 
of needed improvement.  This provides the officers with an understanding of how 
                                            
41 Cadet Command Regulation 145-3, Reserve Officer Training Corps Pre-commissioning 
Training and Leadership Development, United States Army Cadet Command (Fort Monroe, VA: 
20 September 2006), 2-2. 
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to better apply what they’ve learned to the situation in which they find 
themselves.  In lay terms, one might refer to this domain as “on-the-job” training, 
or OJT.  In the Army of today, most of what we learn about warfighting is 
generated in this domain.  It is heavily oriented on task training and successful 
performance of those tasks in the combat environment 
The final learning domain is self-development and is “based on a 
feedback-driven process of activities and learning that contributes to professional 
competence, organizational effectiveness, and personal development to enhance 
potential to succeed in progressively complex, higher-level responsibilities.”42  
The intent of self development is to augment and accelerate the learning 
developed earlier in the institutional domain and day-to-day actions in the 
operational domain.  Critical to the success of self-development is the active 
participation of senior commanders in the mentorship and counseling of young 
leaders to orient their self-development activities.  Advanced civilian degrees 
exemplify one important component of officer self-development, but Army policy 
typically restricts graduate school attendance to mid-career officers, either 
seasoned captains or majors. 
1. Pre-commissioning Education in the Institutional Domain 
There are two main sources of education for the commissioning of officers 
in the U.S. Army: ROTC and the United States Military Academy at West Point 
(USMA).  Both require a curriculum of military studies in addition to traditional 
undergraduate coursework, and result in the award of a baccalaureate degree 
and commissioning as a Second Lieutenant.  A third source of commissioning, 
the Officer Candidate School (OCS), produces far fewer Second Lieutenants 
than the others.  OCS candidates are service members who have served in the 
field as enlisted soldiers, and have, at some point, nearly completed  
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undergraduate education.  Since we cannot alter the education that these 
candidates have already received, often prior to entering service and attendance 
in OCS, it will not be addressed in this study. 
a. Reserve Officer’s Training Corps (ROTC) 
ROTC was born in 1916 when President Wilson signed the 
National Defense Act.43  Initially created to fill wartime gaps in production when 
USMA could not sustain the World War I build-up of forces, ROTC is now the 
major source of the Army’s officer corps.  Commissioning 4050 second 
lieutenants in 2007, ROTC now accounts for roughly 75% of all commissioned 
officers.  Sixty percent of ROTC graduates go on to serve the Active Army, while 
the rest enter the U.S. Army Reserve or National Guard.44  The total number of 
cadets and institutions offering ROTC has ebbed and flowed over the years, 
commensurate with the Army’s build-up or draw-down of forces.  Today, Army 
ROTC is offered on 273 campuses around the country, with 26,000 students 
enrolled.45 
U.S. Army Cadet Command, responsible for the development and 
implementation of Army ROTC is structured in two geographic regions, East and 
West.  Regions are subdivided into Brigades, with eight brigades in the Western 
Region and six in the Eastern.  Brigades are further sub-divided into battalions, 
with each school having that designation; there are 273 ROTC battalions, one for 
each school having an ROTC program.  Staffing these battalions are 
approximately 2.7 officers per battalion and a total of 680 contract cadre.  Each 
school or “battalion” is commanded by a Major or Lieutenant Colonel, either on 
active duty or in the reserves. 
                                            
43 United States Army Cadet Command Headquarters [website]; available from 
http://www.rotc.usaac.army.mil/history.html; accessed 11 October 2007. 
44 “ROTC: The and Now,” [Briefing], United States Army Cadet Command, Office of the G-5, 
(Fort Monroe, VA: 6 August 2007). 
45 Ibid. 
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Army ROTC offers scholarships as incentive for entry into the 
program.  These scholarships range in duration from 2 to 4 years and pay for 
most college expenses, though there is a cap of $20,000 per year, per student.  
Therefore, scholarships to schools with more expensive tuition may not cover all 
costs of attendance.  Currently, there are no requirements as to what field of 
study a cadet must pursue; only that it results in a baccalaureate degree.  
Graduating scholarship cadets owe eight years of service; those going to the 
Active Army will spend at least four of those years on active duty, with the 
remainder in the Army Reserve or Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  Graduates 
going immediately to the Army Reserve or National Guard typically spend all 
eight years in those organizations. 
The PME in ROTC is broken down into four parts, all of which 
constitute BOLC I: baccalaureate degree, completion of military science and 
leadership (MSL) advanced classes (the four taken during the junior and senior 
year), the Leadership Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) and the 
Enhanced Skills Training Program (ESTP).  LDAC is a 33 day long summer 
course at Fort Lewis, WA.  The LDAC mission is to train cadets to Army 
standards, develop leadership, and assess officer leadership potential.  “LDAC is 
the single most important training event in the career of a cadet.  It is often their 
first exposure to Army life on an active Army installation and one of the few 
opportunities where cadets from various parts of the country undergo a common, 
high-quality training experience.”46  ESTP “assesses and develops ROTC 
cadet’s communication, problem solving and analytical skills through diagnostic 
adaptive assessments and skills enhancement training in basic mathematics, 
English grammar, and reading.”47  The ESTP is an online assessment tool and is 
generally completed by cadets during their second or third years of school. 
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Training and Leadership Development, Off-campus Training, United States Army Cadet 
Command (Fort Monroe, VA: 23 January 2006), 1-5. 
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The ROTC curriculum is broken down into four years of instruction, 
Military Science and Leadership (MSL) levels I-IV, corresponding to the four 
years of undergraduate study.  MSL I cadets are typically freshman, while MSL 
IV cadets are seniors.  Cadets may enter the ROTC program as late as the end 
of their sophomore year, often applying for 2-year scholarships.  These cadets 
must attend the Leader’s Training Course (LTC) in the summer before their junior 
year of school.  The purpose of this training is to bring cadets up to speed with 
others who’ve already completed MSL I and II courses as a freshman and 
sophomore, respectively.  About 1,200 cadets enter ROTC as two year 
scholarship winners and attend this training every year.48   
In each semester of undergraduate study, cadets take one of the 
eight MSL courses.  Most schools offer elective credit for having completed the 
MSL course.  In addition to the MSL classes, cadets participate in a leadership 
lab every week, focused on skill training related to the MSL class.  Classes are 
typically 1-2 hours a week, with the leadership lab adding another two.  Each 
MSL class contains 12 lessons, with divided focus areas in leadership, personal 
development, officership, tactics and techniques, values and ethics and 
evaluation.49  The advanced level courses, MSL 301, 302, 401 and 402, are all 
conducted during the final two years of schooling.  They challenge cadets to 
study, practice and evaluate adaptive leadership skills by placing them in 
challenging, complex leadership scenarios, using squad tactical operations as a 
vehicle.50  Junior and senior cadets also fill leadership positions within the cadet 
battalion and assist cadre in the development of courses and evaluation of 
younger cadets.  Cadets also participate in two field training exercises (FTX) per 
year; one in each semester.  These exercises are typically conducted at a nearby 
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military installation and range in duration from 24 to 96 hours.  During these 
exercises and the weekly leadership labs, all cadets must receive training on 85 
tasks that are required on the BOLC Common Core Task List.  Tasks range from 
marksmanship, to medical training, to dealing with the media.  Each task must be 
performed to a published standard and evaluated prior to commissioning.51 
ROTC education has evolved significantly over the years, with the 
most recognizable changes in number of institutions providing ROTC and core 
curricula.  ROTC units are down to 273 from over 400 during the 1980’s and 
cadre numbers are down to 2.7 per cadet battalion, from 5.2 per battalion 20 
years ago.  In downsizing, Cadet Command has been able to better standardize 
the education that future officers receive and better focus the efforts of its smaller 
cadre force.  The primary challenge of ROTC remains the amount of time 
available for instruction.  Compared to USMA cadets, ROTC cadets spend far 
fewer hours of their 4 year undergraduate career in direct contact with military 
cadre and military training.  Continuing to provide for adequate military education 
will depend on prioritization, making the best use of this most precious asset. 
b. The United States Military Academy at West Point 
(USMA) 
The history of the United States Military Academy at West Point 
began in 1802 when President Jefferson signed legislation mandating its 
creation.  Since that time it has commissioned over 50,000 officers into the U.S. 
Army.52  Today, the academy graduates and commissions roughly 900 active 
duty lieutenants each year, 25% of all lieutenants.53 All graduates receive a  
                                            
51 The BOLC Common Core task list is intended to provide a foundation of skills necessary 
to continue in BOLC II, after commissioning.  The 85 tasks are subdivided into those that are 
deemed critical, important and “as time permits.” 
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Bachelors of Science degree and can major in one of several programs.  Upon 
graduation, USMA cadets are required to serve on active duty in the Army for a 
period of five years. 
Admission to USMA is open to men and women who’ve received a 
nomination from a Congressman or the Department of the Army and have met 
the academic, physical and medical requirements.  Each year, USMA admits 
1,150 to 1,200 cadets into the freshman class.54  Academic evaluation for 
incoming students is based, like most colleges, on high school record and either 
the SAT or ACT score.  The Academy also makes assessments on character 
and leadership potential.  The physical and medical requirements mark the key 
difference in USMA admissions as compared to its civilian counterparts.  
The mission of USMA is “to educate, train and inspire the Corps of 
Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed 
to the values of Duty, Honor, Country; professional growth throughout a career 
as an officer in the United States Army; and a lifetime of service to the Nation.”55  
To accomplish this, the Academy has instilled three formal programs that 
constitute the Cadet Leader Development System: the academic program, the 
military program and the physical program.56 
The academic program seeks to broadly educate leaders for 
lifelong service who can anticipate and respond effectively in the changing 
security environment.  The core curriculum for all cadets includes 26 core 
classes, an information technology class and a three class engineering sequence 
for non-engineering majors.57  In addition to the core course offering, cadets may 
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choose a field of study or major, offering an additional 10 to 18 elective courses.  
Much of the core curriculum is accomplished in the first two years of education, 
making the early experience of cadets relatively common amongst all.  The core 
curriculum requires all cadets to complete classes in chemistry, computer 
science, economics, English, foreign languages, history, international relations, 
law, leadership, literature, math, military history, philosophy, physics, geography, 
and political science.  This core provides a breadth of knowledge and 
understanding on which to build with specific studies pertaining to the major or 
field of study chosen.  USMA offers more than 30 disciplines in which to major or 
select as a field of study. 
The military program consists of study in military science, joint 
professional military education (JPME) and military training, to include summer 
training.  The goal of military science studies is to develop the foundational 
military skills and troop leading procedures required of junior officers.58   Each 
cadet must complete a core military science curriculum of eight courses, 
including introduction to the Army, warfighting, tactics, combined arms operations 
and tactical leadership.  Additionally, cadets can choose a major in Military Arts 
and Science by completing 10 military courses in addition to the required eight 
core courses.  Three of the ten are required, the remaining seven are chosen 
from 32 available electives.  Military Arts and Sciences majors may also choose 
a specialty track in either operations or irregular warfare.  The JPME program is 
designed to familiarize cadets with the structures and capabilities of other 
services and joint force structures.59 
The military training portion of the curriculum introduces and 
evaluates basic military skills and is predominantly conducted in the summer 
before their first year and in the summers between subsequent school years.  
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Cadet Basic Training (CBT) and Cadet Field Training (CFT) are conducted prior 
to the first and second years of school, respectively.  During these training 
periods, cadets learn and perform military tasks such as foot-marching, land-
navigation and marksmanship.  All military training conducted while at USMA 
constitutes the Basic Officer Leadership Course I, including the same 85 tasks 
required by ROTC.   
The physical program is designed to “develop warrior leaders of 
character who are physically and mentally tough by engaging cadets in activities 
that promote and enhance a healthy lifestyle, physical fitness, movement 
behavior, and psychomotor performance.”60  Physical education is a USMA 
requirement during all four years of study at the academy.  Freshman cadets 
complete courses in combatives, boxing (men only), self defense (women only), 
swimming and military movements (gymnastics).  In addition to the required 
courses, cadets must compete in a competitive sport through intramurals, clubs 
or as a member of the Army team.  The purpose of the freshman curriculum is to 
establish a baseline of physical abilities required of military service.  In their 
second year, cadets add wellness to the physical education (PE) curriculum, 
learning about health-related issues and quality of life.  As in all other years, 
cadets must continue to compete in competitive sports.  Adding lifetime sports 
and unit fitness to the curriculum in upper class years, cadets complete what is 
called the Master Fitness Trainer program.  The Department of Physical 
Education Lifetime Sports Program is “designed to develop a foundation of skills, 
knowledge, and personal attributes, which will enable cadets to successfully 
participate in lifetime sports, provide motivation for continued improvement and 
establish a pattern of physical activity for a lifetime.”61 
The three programs, academic, military and physical, combine to 
form the core of the Cadet Leadership Development System (CLDS).  The quote 
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below summarizes the overall, fluid process that constitutes the CLDS.  It is 
designed for production of the ideal officer for service in the Army; articulated in 
the USMA Vision 2010 as “prepared for ambiguity and uncertainty and 
understanding of the unique characteristics of the profession and the principles 
that govern the fulfillment of their office.” 
The Cadet Leader Development System is an organizing 
framework designed to coordinate and integrate cadet 
developmental activities across the entire West Point Experience. 
CLDS Is theoretically informed, goal-oriented, and continuously 
assessed. It is designed to organize cadets’ experiences so that 
USMA achieves its institutional goals, accomplished its assigned 
mission, and realizes its strategic vision. Informed by Army 
traditions and proven concepts about how to develop officers, 
CLDS provides the structure, process, and content for cadets’ 47-
month journey from “new cadet” to “commissioned leader of 
character.62 
2. Post-commissioning Education in the Institutional Domain 
Upon commissioning, new lieutenants enter the second and third parts of 
their professional education, known as BOLC I and BOLC II.  These courses 
constitute the final training requirements of young officers before they enter the 
field.  The focus of BOLC II and III is training the skills required of Army officers in 
general, and those tasks necessary for specific branches. 
BOLC II is a six week training program conducted at Fort Benning, GA, or 
Fort Sill, OK.  The courses are branch immaterial and are intended to inculcate 
the Warrior Ethos by training new lieutenants in basic combat skills.  The mission 
of BOLC II is to “develop competent, confident and adaptable Lieutenants, 
grounded in warrior tasks, able to lead Soldiers in the contemporary operational 
environment.”63  The course design is that of task repetition in order  
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to gain task understanding.  Immersion in the tasks and the learning environment 
is accomplished by conducting the training predominantly in the field.  80-90% of 
the six week training program is conducted in field training exercises.   
Lieutenants are organized into platoons of approximately 40 personnel, 
each platoon being trained by experienced officers and non-commissioned 
officers, 5-6 per platoon.  Throughout the course, lieutenants gain task 
understanding of 39 core tasks, divided into key categories of shoot, move, 
communicate, joint urban operations and fight.  The conduct of many of the tasks 
comes in the form of a situational training exercise (STX) that is essentially a 
vignette of the contemporary operating environment (COE).  In other words, new 
lieutenants are placed in situations that closely resemble those that lieutenants 
will face in combat, and in this situation, with mental and physical stressors, they 
will perform and be evaluated on several of the core tasks.   
While most of the 39 core tasks are individual in nature, lieutenants 
eventually execute them collectively, with lieutenants rotating positions of 
leadership (team leader, squad leader, platoon leader and platoon sergeant).  
During the course, each lieutenant is evaluated in four different leadership 
positions.  As an example, all lieutenants will individually learn to fire their 
weapon and move under direct fire from an armed enemy.  Later, they will train 
as squads, with lieutenants performing the duties of squad and team leaders.  
The squad will execute a collective training event, employing the individual skills 
learned earlier.  This time, their direction is provided by a peer lieutenant being 
evaluated as the squad or team leader.  The lieutenant-comprised squad will 
perform and be evaluated on nine of these “warrior battle drills,” each one 
requiring the use of several of the 39 individual core tasks.  To better replicate 
the COE, the FTX’s are conducted from a forward operating base (FOB), much 
like those used in Iraq and Afghanistan today.  While in the FOB, lieutenant 
squads and platoons will be responsible for security, controlling traffic, managing 
casualties, patrolling and providing a quick reaction force for other elements 
engaged in combat.  The culminating event is a live-fire exercise that replicates a  
 34
mounted patrol being ambushed (with IEDs) by the enemy.  This approach 
allows lieutenants to gain a better understanding of what life will be like when 
they deploy to combat zones. 
To aid in the instilment of the “warrior ethos,” lieutenants in BOLC II will 
undergo a rigorous physical training regiment to include combatives (hand-to-
hand combat), foot marches and “battle-focused” physical training such as 
obstacle courses and confidence courses.  Lieutenants will lead all physical 
training activities.  Physical training is a central part of the BOLC II experience 
and in conducted nearly everyday, including while in the field.   
In the end, BOLC II provides improved understanding and expansion of 
the core skills learned in BOLC I.  It is designed to immerse them in an 
environment that closely resembles what they’ll soon face overseas.  The tasks 
performed introduce officers of all branches to the basic skills needed to be 
performed in direct contact with the enemy.  The endstate is “an Officer who is 
trained in warrior tasks and the warrior Battle Drills, who is self-aware and 
adaptable; an Officer who will not accept defeat and will never quit, who 
demonstrate the characteristics of an Army leader while living the Army Values; 
and who embodies the warrior ethos.”64   The foundation of combat skills now 
trained in all officers, they move next to BOLC III, where they will gain additional 
skills required of their primary branch. 
BOLC III differs significantly from prior educational courses for the majority 
of lieutenants.  In BOLC III, officers continue their education by learning the 
specific technical and tactical skills of their branch.  Each of the 16 Army 
branches has a BOLC III course and range in duration from 6 to 16 weeks.  The 
individualized course curricula focus the officers learning on specialized tasks.  
For instance, infantry officers continue to learn tactics, techniques and 
procedures for conducting infantry type missions, ranging from varying types of 
raids and attacks to defensive operations. Field artillery officers will train on the 
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tasks associated with controlling, allocating and directing fire support to infantry 
and armor units such as cannon artillery, rockets and close air support from fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft.  Completion of BOLC III constitutes the completion of the 
initial military training (IMT) portion of OES.  When officers graduate their 
respective courses, they are considered prepared to enter the warfighting force 
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IV. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the current officer education system, specifically in the 
institutional domain of initial military training, is fundamentally based on the 
development of the qualities of the “Pentathlete” warrior; qualities deemed 
essential in officers preparing to fight the wars of today and tomorrow.  Army 
senior leadership, in the 2007 Army Posture Statement, qualitatively defines the 
Pentathlete leader as multi-skilled and possessing specific leader attributes: 
Skills 
-Strategic and creative thinker. 
-Builder of leaders and teams. 
-Competent full-spectrum warfighter and accomplished professional who 
 supports the soldier. 
-Effective in managing, leading and changing organizations. 
-Skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy. 
-Understands cultural context and works effectively across it. 
Attributes 
-Sets the standard for integrity and character. 
-Confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations: 




-Empathetic and always positive. 
-Professionally educated and dedicated to life-long learning. 
-Effective communicator. 
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This leader “personifies the Warrior Ethos in all aspects, from warfighting 
to statesmanship to enterprise management...it’s a way of life.”65  In short, the 
analysis will assess how well we educate officers to become Army leaders in the 
21st Century, or “Pentathletes.” 
A.  RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS 
The U.S. Army Cadet Command faces perhaps the most daunting 
challenge in educating cadets for future service as Army officers.  Not only is 
ROTC charged with producing 75% of the lieutenants entering service each year, 
but it must do so with the least available time.  The challenge is compounded by 
the very breadth of the system, encompassing 26,000 cadets on more than 273 
campuses around the country.  Despite the challenges, ROTC has made huge 
strides in improving the quality of the education and therefore, the quality of the 
lieutenant that enters BOLC II, BOLC III and the force.  The Reserve Officers 
Training Corps has overcome the hurdles of standardization among the several 
hundred universities to produce consistent, expected results, but problems 
remain. 
1.  Strengths and Improvements 
One of the greatest strengths of the ROTC system is its diversity.  ROTC 
recruits cadets from all walks of life, in every state in the union.  Diversity among 
cadets helps to create an understanding of the differences among people and 
their backgrounds; providing foundational understanding of the cultural 
differences that they will face while operating in other nations.  Diversity has 
improved since joining U.S. Army Cadet Command and U.S. Army Recruiting 
Command under one Accessions command.  This merging of commands has 
produced synergy in recruiting efforts and eases the burden of recruiting.  ROTC 
no longer competes against recruiters for candidates.   
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ROTC has always been faced with the challenge of standardization 
among colleges.  Until recently, U.S. Cadet Command issued broad, “endstate” 
guidance that was to inform ROTC battalions on what type of skills and qualities 
were required of an officer at the time of graduation.  In recent years, Cadet 
Command has published detailed guidance on the knowledge, skills and 
attributes to be developed, when to develop them and in what context.  This 
“pony blanket” lays out the entire four year ROTC curriculum and standardizes it 
across the command.  The freshman cadet at Penn State now participates in the 
exact same curriculum as a freshman cadet at Texas A&M.  No longer do cadet 
battalions have the autonomy to tailor the curriculum based on the experience, 
ideals and desires of their respective cadre.   
Recent overhauls of the curriculum have added leadership as an essential 
focus area for the military education of cadets; an area that, historically, was 
addressed very little.  The curriculum now requires formal military leadership 
education in each semester of the four year program.  In a progressive approach, 
freshmen are introduced to Army leadership and the values, attributes and skills 
required of effective officers.  In their sophomore year, they address leader traits 
and behaviors, leadership theory, teambuilding, adaptive leadership, 
transformational leadership and situational leadership.  Advanced course cadets 
(those in their final two years) will study leadership behaviors, peer leadership, 
leadership and culture, team dynamics and motivation.  Informally, advanced 
course cadets will serve in leadership roles within their respective battalions.  
Performing the duties of a squad leader or staff officer help cadets to experiment 
with different leadership styles and analyze their own leadership traits and 
tendencies, while mentoring younger cadets.66  In short, they learn to lead in a 
risk-free environment. 
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Another significant strength of the program is the opportunity afforded 
cadets to seek military training during summer months.  Several ROTC cadets, 
about 20%, have the opportunity every year to attend Airborne School, Air 
Assault School and Mountain Warfare School.  Still others can participate in the 
Cadet Troop Leadership Training (CTLT) program where they serve in an active 
duty unit and perform the role of platoon leader for approximately a month in the 
summer before their senior year.  Here they are supervised and mentored by 
lieutenants and captains and are provided an officer evaluation report (OER) as 
feedback on their performance.  Not only do cadets learn valuable skills by 
attending such training, but they also develop a keen sense of Army culture and 
get a glimpse of the Army life. 
Lastly, the ROTC program brings the military and private sector to a closer 
relationship.  Unlike USMA, ROTC cadets spend their time, both in and out of 
class with everyday civilian students, not in isolation from them.  Cadets can 
interact academically and socially with anyone on campus, bringing a better 
understanding of the military to them.  This interaction also keeps ROTC cadets 
informed of how they and the military are perceived by many Americans.  These 
civil-military relations can translate to an increased ability of ROTC cadets to 
understand and handle civilian interactions with a native populace and the media. 
2.  Challenges 
Despite recent advancements in the quality of the curriculum, ROTC’s 
ability to adequately provide the type of education required of junior officers in the 
COE is not yet fully developed; and the challenges are numerous.  Some 
challenges may be beyond the control of Cadet Command, while others may be 
the result of curriculum design, instructor capability and focus. 
One of the fundamental challenges facing ROTC is that of recruitment.  In 
2007, ROTC had a mission of producing 4,500 new lieutenants, but produced 
only 4,050.  ROTC cadre and recruiters must continually seek out candidates to 
fill needed slots in the cadet ranks.  This challenge has the potential to bring less 
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than optimal cadets into the program, including those who only desire to 
participate in order to pay for school.  This type of cadet tends to participate only 
minimally and can affect the overall quality of the end product, the commissioned 
second lieutenant. 
Cadets do not major in ROTC and as such, ROTC is perceived by some 
students as more of an “add-on” to their undergraduate curriculum and not a 
central component of it.  Civilian education requirements of the school take 
priority and ROTC has no input in the types of classes in which cadets enroll or 
their respective schedules.  In this sense, there is no way for Cadet Command to 
ensure that a cadet’s major and associated curricula are best preparing them for 
military service.  Cadets are free to choose the major and electives that best 
serve them, and not necessarily the Army.  In fact, some cadets may enroll in 
classes whose subject matter and professors may be opposed to military service 
and the mission of the Army.67  This fact, though negative on the surface, may 
actually help to foster a better understanding of civilian perceptions.  Additionally, 
a cadet whose major is marine biology, for instance, may not enroll in any course 
that provides significant enhancement of their ability to lead soldiers on the 
battlefield.  A cadet in this circumstance may develop none of the skills and 
attributes of a Pentathlete leader through attainment of a baccalaureate degree.  
In this case, nearly every aspect of preparation for Army leadership falls in the 
hands of a few cadre, with limited time outside of the civilian curriculum to 
introduce the material and develop the knowledge, skills and attributes required. 
Time, then, becomes a major obstacle faced by ROTC cadre in 
developing cadets into Pentathlete leaders.  On average, freshman cadets spend 
2.5 hours per week in the ROTC curriculum, sophomores spend 3.5 hours and 
juniors and seniors spend 4.5 hours.68  This hourly average may vary depending 
on the institution.  This provides for a cumulative average of 30 hours per 
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semester for freshman and up to 54 hours per semester for seniors.  In terms of 
a 40 hour work week, this amounts to a week and a half per year for freshman 
and two and a half weeks per year for seniors.  Even when the one-per-semester 
FTX’s are added in, this only adds another work week to the curriculum.  While 
cadets are encouraged to participate in extracurricular ROTC activities, they are 
not mandatory and not all cadets are willing or able to spend the extra time.  If a 
cadet were to add up the total time spent in professional military education, he or 
she would find that over four years, they would have spent only 16-17 weeks, 
including the mandatory LDAC between their junior and senior years.  Given 
such time constraints, prioritization of the ROTC curriculum becomes paramount. 
So, we must ask how well Cadet Command has prioritized the curriculum 
in order to produce the skills and attributes of the Pentathlete leader, noted at the 
beginning of this chapter.  Analyzing the ROTC 8 core curriculum classes and 
corresponding labs will show that cadets spend 60.5 of 360 instruction hours 
(16.8%) on what Cadet Command considers leadership training, 17 of 360 
(4.7%) on personal development, 44.5 of 360 (12.4%) on officership, 188 of 360 
(52.2%) on tactics and techniques, 16 of 360 (4.4%) on values and ethics and 25 
of 360 (6.9%) on overview and assessment.69  This course breakdown clearly 
indicates that tactics and techniques have greater priority within the ROTC 
curriculum than all other development areas combined.  The fundamental flaw of 
this design is that pre-commissioning officer education looks more like task 
training than education.  ROTC places the burden of education on the civilian 
institution, on whose curriculum ROTC has no input.  
The execution of collective task training in which cadets are placed in 
leadership positions and evaluated, often by senior level cadets, does enhance 
the leadership learning experience of the exercise.  But collective task training or 
“battle drills” require extensive individual training prior to reaching a level of 
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competence where cadets can execute the tasks collectively.  Therefore, the 
exercise, event or “vehicle” used to teach adaptability, a squad attack for 
example, necessitates that an inordinate amount of time be spent on individual 
soldier skills.  All of this time (52.2% of the curriculum) spent on task training is in 
preparation for BOLC II; a course designed to teach task training.  In the Army’s 
terms, we are familiarizing cadets with the tasks in pre-commissioning and 
developing task understanding in BOLC II.  Overall, redundant task training is 
executed at the expense of time that could be spent on educating cadets on 
leadership, cultural awareness, self-awareness and strategic and creative 
thinking.  Furthermore, educational development in these areas does not require 
any preparatory task familiarization, and very little resources.  What they require 
is time and an educated instructor. 
It is the education of instructors that further hampers the leadership 
development of cadets.  New ROTC cadre attend  a variety of short courses, 1-2 
weeks in length, orienting them to the program and providing instruction on how 
to perform the duties of educating cadets.  Unfortunately, ROTC does not require 
advanced degrees of its instructors, though the command does encourage cadre 
to enroll in graduate level courses while assigned to their ROTC detachment.70  
Their military experience ensures that they are well prepared to fill the roles of 
trainer and mentor, but their abilities as an educator are limited to the 
undergraduate education they received as cadets.  That education, as with that 
of today’s cadets, may have provided little of the knowledge required of 
Pentathlete leaders.  In effect, our military educators may possess no better 
understanding of strategic and creative thinking, governance, diplomacy, 
statesmanship, and be no more adaptive or innovative than those they teach.  
Without question, many have become familiar with these skills and attributes in 
the operational learning domain, but their ability to learn in the operational 
domain is founded in the institutional domain of their own pre-commissioning 
education. 
                                            
70 Steven Vanstraten, “Re: ROTC Program.” Email to author, 30 October 2007. 
 44
B.  THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY 
USMA has, in recent years, undertaken a complete revision of its 
approach to educating cadets for the future operating environment.  In a more 
holistic approach, every aspect of a cadet’s experience, from entry to graduation, 
is carefully designed to build the skills and attributes of the Pentathlete leader.  
Cadets entering USMA are completely immersed in the Army, from military 
specific training all the way to the classrooms of their undergraduate degree 
program. 
1.  Strengths and Improvements 
Not surprisingly, many of the strengths of the USMA program of education 
directly address the predominant challenges facing ROTC.  The first and 
foremost is time.  USMA cadets are considered active duty military, and as such, 
every day of their undergraduate education is controlled and administered by the 
USMA faculty.  From first call to lights out, everything a cadet does is in the 
interest of officer production and development.  In such an environment, cadre 
and cadets are provided ample time to address both educational development 
and the task familiarization required of military officers.  Unlike ROTC cadets who 
are able to spend summer months away from military training and education 
(with the exception of LDAC and LTC), USMA cadets spend their summers with 
the academy or at other military schools.  The additional time allows cadets to 
focus on education during the academic year and focus on training during the 
summers.  As West Point is a military installation, that time is also better spent; 
the academy possesses all the resources and equipment necessary for training 
without having to travel to other installations and without the restrictions of civilian 
institutions. 
Where civilian institutions are in the business of producing professionals in 
a wide range of fields, the USMA curriculum is designed from floor to ceiling in 
the interest of producing Army officers, regardless of major.  Every field of study 
and every major has, at its heart, the interest of the Army.  The result is a 
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curriculum in which every course, mandatory or elective, possesses some 
intrinsic value to the profession of arms.  Certainly, many of the classes that an 
ROTC cadet may take will be of some value to their future service as Army 
officers, but the fundamental difference is that every class at USMA is taught in 
the context of military service.  All students take engineering courses not to 
become professional engineers, but because, as GEN (Ret) John Galvin says, 
“managing combat power on the battlefield is essentially a scientific / engineering 
endeavor, requiring a commander to solve a complex physical problem.”  The 
core curriculum is sufficiently broad to ensure that cadets are developing 
knowledge in the areas of government, strategy, politics, law, history, 
anthropology and leadership in addition to the math and sciences.  As part of the 
core education, this broad exposure is not optional, but mandatory.  It is because 
of this requirement that USMA cadets are armed with a broader set of skills and 
knowledge as they enter the force.  
Leadership is further developed through the physical program, particularly 
in the requirement that cadets compete in sports.  While we’ve often heard 
ridiculous comparisons of sports to combat, competitive sports due offer a 
measure of leadership experience and often require adaptability and mental 
agility.  Like ROTC, senior level cadets become more involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the school.  Upperclassmen are placed in charge of squads 
companies or even cadet regiments; responsible for planning, supervising and 
mentoring those in their charge.  In doing so, cadets of USMA also experiment 
with leadership styles and develop an understanding of their future 
responsibilities.  Offering majors in leadership and specialty tracks in irregular 
warfare, the USMA cadet can spend an entire undergraduate career studying the 
theory, behaviors, attributes and skills of the Pentathlete leader. 
As stated earlier, Army exposure permeates a USMA cadet’s existence, 
even in the classroom.  While ROTC cadets may be exposed to professors with 
viewpoints counter to the military mission, West Point instructors are 
predominantly Army officers.  This brings a contextual knowledge of the subject 
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matter to the learning environment.  Like instructors at civilian institutions, all 
USMA instructors possess an advanced degree, but the education is enhanced 
by their previous experiences leading troops; enabling them to relate the 
importance of the subject matter to successful officership, not just success in that 
field of study.  Having done the things cadets hope to do, they also serve as role 
models. 
2.  Challenges 
For its many accomplishments in the education of adaptive, agile, 
contextually and culturally aware officers, USMA is not without its challenges.  
One of the fundamental challenges is one of diversity.  USMA enrolls students 
from all over the country, from every ethnicity and cultural background.  The lack 
of diversity comes not from where the cadets originate, but in personality.  As the 
cultural separation between the military and civilian populace increases, USMA 
attracts recruits with a narrower set of personality traits, ideologies and beliefs.  
One could certainly argue that this is a positive aspect, in comparison to some 
ROTC students who may be “in it for the money;” but as American society 
becomes more polarized politically and diffuse in terms of issues demanding 
personal attention and public response, USMA may find itself drawing from an 
ever shrinking pool of service minded young Americans with desires for a military 
career.  For this reason, USMA graduates have always fought a “cookie-cutter” 
stigma amongst officers from other commissioning sources. 
Joint understanding is one of the key components of an effective 
institutional education program for future officers.  Previously, joint education 
wasn’t even considered until officers reach the field grade ranks, but reality in 
today’s operating environment necessitates that even lieutenants receive joint 
educational experience.  USMA offers joint professional military education (JPME 
classes, but are not required by all cadets.  A small portion of the cadet corps are 
offered the opportunity to train both with other service academies and in military 
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schools of other nations, but again, the numbers are not significant enough to 
provide a graduating class with the necessary joint indoctrination. 
C.  BOLC II AND III 
Attendance in the final two phases of the Basic Officer Leadership Course 
completes the initial military training of the officer education system.  Of the three 
phases, BOLC II and III require the least change or modification.  In Vandergriff’s 
educational model, the long term development of knowledge must precede the 
short term mastery of skills.71  If BOLC I (pre-commissioning) correctly focuses 
on education, then the short-term tactical skill focus of BOLC II and III are 
commensurate with effective officer development.  BOLC II and III are 
necessarily oriented on performance of the types of tasks Army leaders must 
perform effectively in combat and instilling a sense of warrior ethos.  The 
program of instruction (POI) of BOLC II and III, however, could be better 
designed, allowing more learning and less performing to occur in BOLC I.  In 
reality, the only change would be an extension of the BOLC II course by 2-3 
weeks.  Implementing this change will allow lieutenants to arrive at BOLC II with 
little or no tactical or technical individual training, freeing up invaluable pre-
commissioning education time to spend on developing the knowledge, 
adaptability and cognitive skills required of 4GW. 
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
What is needed is more than just getting officers to think at the 
strategic level of war and politics, but educating officers to think 
broadly and contextually, and providing them a wider and deeper 
way of seeing the world. This is not an either/or proposition; rather, 
it suggests a greater fusion between training and education across 
the officer's career....to successfully grow strategic leaders for its 
new jurisdiction, the Army cannot wait until the 20-year point in its 
officers' careers to educate them in security studies. That should be 
a part of the professional military education program from one's 
pre-commissioning education, building continuously at each formal 
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school, during unit Officer Professional Development, and through  
continuing education. The senior service college experience can 
then become a capstone program in advanced strategic studies as 
opposed to an introduction to strategy. 72 
At the heart of transformation of any organization is education.  Only 
leaders educated in a new way can take the organization in a new direction.  
Transformation of our institutional education systems has begun, but only 
recently and only incrementally; raising the question, is it transformational at all?  
The challenges that our educational institutions face must be addressed in terms 
of producing an entirely different officer, not a variation on a theme.  USMA has 
come the farthest in meeting the goal of creating and nurturing adaptive, 
innovative, broadly educated officers, but their challenges were fewer and less 
profound.  The ROTC curriculum of today is unrecognizable to those of us who 
participated more than 10 years ago, but continues to face many of the same 
issues.  Because the challenges facing ROTC are both more numerous and 
more difficult to overcome, most of the recommendations will pertain specifically 
to it. 
The ROTC curriculum has changed dramatically and must continue to 
change even more dramatically.  The curriculum correctly addresses the 
fundamentals required of Army officers, but they are not prioritized to provide 
effective education, but training.  With more than 52% of the core curriculum 
spent training tactics and techniques, ROTC has relegated personal 
development, values, officership and most importantly, leadership, to the back 
burner.  Leadership must take its place at the forefront of all educational 
objectives and will demand classroom and instructor attention fitting of that 
position.  With only 360 hours of core curriculum instruction, a few FTX’s and 33 
days of LDAC, it becomes almost imperative that nearly all of that time be spent  
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on leadership.  The development of leadership must focus on developing the 
knowledge and nurturing the attributes that Pentathlete leaders will require in the 
COE.   
The 8 core courses and 360 hours of the ROTC curriculum must develop 
adaptability, cognitive skills, contextual understanding of the environment, 
including the nature of irregular conflict, cultural understanding, politico-military 
relations including defense and foreign strategy and policy, history, and human 
behavior studies.  Only then will Pentathlete leaders fill tomorrow’s ranks.  
Implementation of this type of curriculum will not be a one-size-fits-all endeavor.  
Where the college offers these types of courses, and nearly every college offers 
some courses that fit the developmental need, they must be required; cadets can 
take them as electives.  Some schools may be willing to work with Cadet 
Command to create or modify courses already offered in order to more effectively 
provide this breadth of knowledge, extending the course offering to all students at 
the university.  In certain instances, college educators may be willing and able to 
design entire fields of study to meet the Army’s needs, much as USMA has done 
with their academic program.  Of course, the creation of specific, tailored 
programs and courses will require Federal funding incentives and curricula 
development guidelines and criteria.  
In other words, Cadet Command must make better use of the varying 
curricula of universities to assist in the development of the knowledge areas most 
pertinent to Army officers.  Let’s say, for example, that a cadet at Penn State 
University is a mechanical engineering major.  In fulfillment of their baccalaureate 
degree, the cadet must take 45 General Education credits.  Twenty-seven of 
these classes are mandated by the degree curriculum and include writing, 
English literature, natural sciences like physics and either chemistry or biology, 
computer science, math, economics and effective speech.73  While none of these 
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may directly translate to development of effective Pentathlete leaders, the cadet 
still has 18 more General Education credits that must be completed, all of which 
are self-determined.  Rather than allow cadets to choose the remaining classes 
based on personal preference, why not mandate those classes that best prepare 
them for service as a second lieutenant in today’s operating environment?  With 
respect to the required Pentathlete leader skills in the previous chapter, ROTC 
cadre can hand-select a series of 18 credits (or more) that best meet those 
requirements from available course offerings.  Specific examples from the Penn 
State course catalog,74 in terms of developing Pentathlete skills and attributes 
are: 
Strategic and Creative Thinker 
-Public policy 
-U.S. Foreign relations 
-American military history 




-International relations in the Middle East 
-Culture and world politics 
-Globalization and its implications 
-U.S. intelligence and policy making 
-International relations 
-National Security policy 
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-Game theory and international relations 
Builder of leaders and teams 
-Introductory psychology 
-Human relations 





Effective in managing, leading and changing organizations 
-Social influence and small groups 
-Organizational processes and structures 
-Mediation 
-Introductory management 
-Organization and people 
Skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy 
-American political culture 
-Constitutional law 
-Persuasion and propaganda 
-Mediation 
-Conflict resolution and negotiation 
-International communication 
-Introduction to comparative politics 
-The politics of terrorism 
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Understands cultural context and works effectively across it 
-Foreign studies (nations critical to U.S. security interests) 
-Arabic 
-Introduction to anthropology 
-Comparative social organizations 
-Language, culture and society 
-Introduction to Islam and Islamic civilization 
-The contemporary Middle East 
-Ethnic nationalism and global conflict 
-World philosophies and cultures 
-Ethnic and racial politics 
Using Penn State as an illustrative example, it is easy to see that 
modification of a cadet’s required curriculum does, in fact, provide tremendous 
payoffs in the degree of officer preparation afforded to them in terms of the skills 
defined as necessary of the Pentathlete leader.  However, not every school 
possesses the same breadth of available courses.  In those circumstances it will 
require the thorough involvement of local ROTC cadre, armed with Federal 
monetary incentives, to design and incorporate courses specifically tailored to 
develop the Pentathlete skills.  Whether readily available or specifically created, 
courses of this nature expand the developmental opportunities of cadets with 
minimal additional requirements placed upon ROTC cadre.  In cases where 
universities are unable to offer courses of this nature, ROTC cadre must be 
educated to make up the difference.  ROTC cadre should be required to possess 
an advanced degree.  More specifically, the graduate education must be carefully 
tailored to produce not only cadre educated in the required knowledge areas, but 
adept at educating.  The opportunity to attend graduate school at no cost may 
also provide an additional recruitment benefit for ROTC cadre.  Beyond creating 
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or mandating particular courses, Cadet Command can further influence 
development of Pentathlete leader skills by mandating certain degree programs 
in their entirety.  Establishing quotas or percentage requirements for certain 
degrees can ensure an adequate mix of educational and background 
experiences.  Offering additional monetary incentives to cadets who complete 
more applicable programs will help to ensure effective balance with other 
programs. 
Combining Air Force, Army and Navy ROTC may provide two distinct 
benefits.  First, it will truly inculcate a culture of jointness among cadets, thereby 
allowing all services to field junior leaders with a full understanding of the 
capabilities, structure, culture and operations of the others.  The second benefit 
is one of resources.  Combining these programs reduces administrative costs 
and office space, consolidates the issuance of equipment and could provide 
more cadet-cadre interaction and contact.  If we’ve truly committed ourselves to 
leadership education vice soldier training, does it really matter if an Air Force 
officer is helping a cadet develop cognitive and critical thinking skills instead of 
an Army officer?  USMA can help to develop a joint culture by expanding its 
exchange program to more students and for longer periods of time.  Here too, the 
assumption is that it matters not in what branch of service your instructor is, as 
long as he or she is properly educated and a skilled educator.  For that matter, if 
the goal is education, is it out of the question to combine the service academies? 
Branch specific skills can still be developed in summer training periods, but the 
core academic curricula need not look much different from one service to 
another. 
In educating leaders, we must come to accept the fact that not everyone 
can be taught.  Just as not everyone is cut out to be a doctor, not everyone is cut 
out to lead soldiers in combat.  Yet, very few, if any, cadets in either USMA or 
ROTC are ever disenrolled or dropped because of poor leadership.  We drop  
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cadets for academic performance, physical performance, illness and injury; but 
almost never because they lack the potential to lead.  Everything must be done 
to allow a cadet to graduate.75  Efforts must shift from quantity to quality. 
Building knowledge in the areas earlier mentioned is easy compared to 
creating adaptability and cognitive and emotional development.  As Vandergriff 
acknowledges in Raising the Bar, the Army is great at describing what is needed, 
a Pentathlete leader for example, but not very adept at explaining how.76  So, 
how do we train adaptability? 
In his adaptive course module (ACM), Vandergriff explains how to teach 
and evaluate adaptability and how to select and train teachers.  ACM has four 
pillars to enhance cognitive development, emotional development and 
knowledge.  ACM involves case study, tactical decision games (TDGs), free-play 
exercises and constant and consistent feedback from peers and instructors.77  
Adaptability involves cognitive skills, problem-solving skills and meta-cognitive 
skills (assessment of your own thoughts and understanding the consequences of 
action).78  Vandergriff illustrates the employment of tactical decision games by 
placing cadets in continuously changing situations that increase in complexity.  
TDG’s introduce cadets to the unknown where they are forced to find answers for 
themselves, thereby learning how to think.  An example is to give mission orders 
that will prove inappropriate to the situation and let the cadet resolve the conflict 
between the two.  Other examples he details involve giving mission changes as a 
cadet prepares his solution to the original problem or intentionally giving vague 
guidance, forcing the cadet to make assumptions.  The emotional development 
occurs when the cadet learns how his own stress affected his decisions.  The 
ACM is applicable to both USMA and ROTC and can be done in a classroom 
environment with little time and almost no resources.  Repetitive applications of 
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such techniques will allow cadets to discern patterns in their own behavior and 
reactions and those of other cadets.  Many ROTC programs and some post-
commissioning courses have adopted versions or parts of the ACM, but it has yet 
to come into widespread use or be formalized.  This occurrence will help to 
produce the type of adaptive leaders our senior leaders are demanding. 
As cadets graduate to lieutenants and attend BOLC II and III, they must 
shift in part from an education dominated curriculum to task training that 
reinforces that education.79  Here, free-play during the execution of BOLC II’s 
“warrior battle drills” will enable cognitive development by allowing lieutenants to 
solve tactical problems in any manner they choose, with instructors oriented on 
result, not the process.80  Doing so in a risk-free environment fosters creativity 
and critical thinking.  Extending BOLC II in duration affords more time to train on 
some of the individual warrior skills and will, in the end, reduce the perceived 
need of ROTC and USMA cadre to focus on them; instead spending more time 
on education. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Whatever one might think of the post-Cold War international 
environment, one conclusion seems certain: the demands placed 
on the leaders of the nations military have grown in scope and 
complexity.  The demands extend well beyond the traditional 
military responsibilities for fielding well-trained and equipped forces 
to carryout combat operations...the brief history of the post-Cold 
War period has reinforced the need for military officers who are not 
only technically and tactically proficient, but well-versed in strategy, 
culture, information systems and decision-making.81 
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In meeting these new requirements we must first recognize the differences 
between education and training both in duration and result.  Education is a long 
term process of knowledge building while training involves the mastery of a skill.  
The leaders of tomorrow’s war will benefit far less from the mastery of tactical 
military skills than from accumulating the knowledge that affords them the ability 
to put the situation in the context of the larger picture, understand their emotions 
and the consequences of their decisions, critically analyze their options and 
realize that the decision may not be a military one.  The security environment of 
today causes a melding of the tactical, the operational and the strategic.  
 Tomorrow’s lieutenants may find themselves at once immersed in all 
three.  As war looks less like war, solutions to complex problems involve fewer 
military tactics and more mental agility and adaptability.  Production of officers 
possessing these traits is paramount to transforming a force fit to wage war and 
peace anywhere in the conflict spectrum.  The creation of these officers will occur 
more in the classroom than in the field.  As such, the preparation of junior officers 
in the institutional domain must shift from tactical training to tactical, operational 
and strategic education.  Pre-commissioning education must provide the long-
term building of knowledge in the areas critical to the Pentathlete leader.  Only 
then should their education shift to the task mastery of skills critical to military 
effectiveness.  The Army spends considerable time in educating our mid-level 
and senior leaders.  The Intermediate Level Education at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 
the Naval Postgraduate School and the Army War College are all outstanding 
examples of education programs that impart the knowledge and skills required of 
today’s leaders.  Mid-level and senior leaders, however, are not within arms 
length of the enemy, or the people they are charged with protecting.  Continuing 
to postpone this type of education until mid-career will ensure that those who are 
making the day to day decisions on the ground, the lieutenants, are forever 
unprepared.  Starting early will ensure that our generals are seasoned 
strategists, not rookies who’ve just learned the skill.  COL John Boyd said that  
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“successful armies employ people first, then ideas, then hardware.”  Our Army 
transformation has occurred in reverse, and our people must catch up; starting 
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